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Failing to discipline in SAPS 







It is with unfortunate regularity that we read reports in the 
media about corrupt South African Police Service (SAPS) 
officials and officials implicated in other crimes, including 
human rights violations.
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 Indicative of the scale of the problem 
is that the Ethics Institute found that for the first time bribes 
for police matters and criminal charges moved into the top five 
of categories of bribes reported, with 7% of respondents 
reporting that they knew someone that were asked to pay a 
bribe to the police. 
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 This translates to nearly one in ten South 
Africans.  Soliciting bribes on such a scale is deeply damaging 
to public trust and confidence in the police. Moreover, the 
prevalence of the problem indicates that there is a perception 
amongst a substantial number of police officials that nothing 
can or will happen when soliciting a bribe even if it is reported. 
This raises serious questions about the enforcement of internal 
discipline in SAPS as the prevalence of bribery is indicative of 




This does not bode well for trust in the police and its perceived 
legitimacy. Given its core mandate to uphold the law, police 
officials engaging in criminal activity are extremely damaging 
to the rule of law and thus democracy itself.  
This fact sheet looks at accountability in SAPS by firstly 
outlining the accountability framework with reference to the 
Constitution. In the following section, quantitative data is 
presented on disciplinary code enforcement in SAPS and 
comparisons are drawn with the Department of Correctional 
Services (DCS). The next section looks at the relationship 
between the Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
(IPID) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) as two 
important players in the accountability architecture.  
The accountability framework 
 
The Constitution requires that public officials be accountable.
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Accountability is understood to mean the relationship 
“between the bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the 
agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that 
right”.
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 This means that a government must be able to and 




indeed explain how it executed its mandate.
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 The point has 
also been made that the normal features of a democracy (e.g. 
multi-party elections and universal suffrage) are necessary, but 
not sufficient to ensure healthy accountability between 
citizens and the government.
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 Democratic elections therefore 
do not make for clean government and new democracies 
remain haunted by human rights violations, nepotism and 




The fact that a relationship exists between the state and 
another internal or external body does not automatically result 
in an effective accountability relationship, and three principles 
need to be adhered to, namely transparency, answerability, 
and controllability. Transparency means that state officials 
have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understandably.
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 The 
actions of officials must be predictable in that they should be 
guided by policy, legislation, regulations, standing orders and 
good practice. When called to account, officials must be able 
to justify their decisions and actions in a manner that is 
rational and justifiable. In sum, it needs to be known what 
officials are doing, and when asked, they must be able to 
provide an understandable and predictable answer.
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 The 
answerability requirement states that decision-makers must be 
able to justify their decisions and actions publicly in order to 
substantiate that they are reasonable, rational and within their 
mandate.
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 Answerability (and transparency) will, however, be 
meaningless if there are not mechanisms in place to sanction 
actions and decisions in contravention of the given mandate; 
accountability institutions must therefore be able to exercise 
control over the institutions that they are overseeing.
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 Failure 
to hold government and individuals accountable creates the 
conditions for impunity to exist.
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A democratic society agrees to give extraordinary powers to 
the police, but only if these powers are subject to external 
scrutiny. Even if a few police officials abuse their powers, it 
risks affecting the legitimacy and integrity of an entire police 
force.
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 It is that need for police legitimacy that firstly drives 
the need for accountability mechanisms. Secondly, the 
purpose of an effective accountability structure is its proactive 
function: the outputs and consequences of action taken by 
accountability mechanisms must lead to changing police 
behaviour and deter misconduct.
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Internal accountability in SAPS 
 
All government departments are required to have internal 
disciplinary structures to enforce its disciplinary code.
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 A 
comparison is made between SAPS and DCS and questions may 
be raised about the different types of work and their 
respective powers. Officials of both departments are defined 
as ‘peace officers’ with powers of arrest in the Criminal 
Procedure Act.
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 Officials of both departments have the 
powers to exercise minimum force.
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 The officials of both 
departments hold considerable power, if not the monopoly of 
power, in respect of suspects and detainees in the case of 
SAPS, and prisoners in the case of DCS officials. Whilst the 
work of SAPS is in general in the public arena and the work of 
DCS officials not, there are nonetheless strong similarities in 
the type of work they do, as well as the risks for the abuse of 
power and position.  There are also strong similarities in the 
disciplinary offences officials from both departments are 
charged with, as reported in the respective annual reports, 
with the most common being: 
• Failed to comply with or contravened an act, 
regulation or legal obligation 
• Absence or repeated absence from work without a 
valid reason or permission 
• Dereliction of duties  
• Breaching of security measures. 
• Conducted himself or herself in an improper, 
disgraceful and unacceptable manner. 




Figure 1 presents the number of disciplinary actions against 
SAPS and DCS officials per 1000 employees in the respective 
departments.
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 DCS data is available from 2002/3 and SAPS 
data from 2007/8. Two trends are immediately visible. The first 
is that disciplinary action against DCS officials have been on a 
steady increase since 2002/3, whilst the opposite is true for 
SAPS as from 2007/8. In the case of DCS this increased from 
below 50 officials per 1000 officials to a high of 106 per 1000 in 
2010/11, followed by a decline and an increase again to 98 per 
1000 officials. In the case of SAPS there were 20 disciplinary 
actions per 1000 in 2007/8 after which it increased to 29 per 
1000 by 2012/13. Since then it has been in decline. Notable is 
that from 2016/17 to 2017/18, this figure dropped from 23 per 
1000 to 10 per 1000, or by 56%.  It should be noted that in 
2016 a new SAPS disciplinary code was gazetted and the sharp 
decline may be attributed in part to teething problems in 




The second observable trend is the vast difference in numbers 
between the two departments. On average, from 2007/8 to 
2017/18, DCS initiated disciplinary action against 82 officials 
per 1000 officials annually. In the case of SAPS, this figure is 23 
per 1000 officials, or 3.5 times less.  
It is also noteworthy that from 2012/13 till 2017/18 an average 
of 62% of SAPS disciplinary cases were withdrawn or the 
finding was not guilty. In the case of DCS this figure on average 
is 7.2%. The implication is that even if disciplinary proceedings 
are brought against a SAPS official, the chances are still 62% 
that he or she will walk away scot-free. It is therefore evident 
that disciplinary cases are not effectively investigated and 
pursued.  
From the comparison it is evident that discipline is enforced at 
vastly differing rates in the two departments. Bear in mind that 
internal disciplinary action will be used for less serious 
violations, relating to the performance of employees and that 
more serious offences will comprise a lesser percentage. That 
DCS is enforcing its disciplinary code at the current rate is 










Per 1000 DCS and SAPS officials subject to displinary action
DCS SAPS Linear (DCS) Linear (SAPS)
Figure 1 




performance requirements, with the argument being that if 
less serious offenses are addressed through disciplinary action, 
it will discourage more serious violation by holding 
transgressing officials accountable. The flip side of this 
argument is that if less serious transgressions are not 
addressed, it opens the door for more serious violations,  
engendering a culture of impunity.  
 
A further indication in SAPS that transgressions need to be 
serious before disciplinary action is undertaken is that over the 
period 2011/12 to 2017/18 on average 8.9% of disciplinary 
proceedings resulted in dismissal compared to 4.2% in DCS for 
the same period.  
IPID investigations compared to 
internal discipline 
 
The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) has a 
specific mandate to investigate serious complaints against 
SAPS officials and SAPS must report these to IPID.
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 From 
Figure 2 below it is apparent that more cases are reported to 
IPID, and thus serious cases, than all the cases handled by SAPS 
through internal disciplinary procedures. This creates the 
impression that there is a perception that IPID is somehow 
responsible for discipline in SAPS, whereas the truth is that this 





IPID refers between 980 and 1500 cases to the NPA annually 
recommending a criminal prosecution.
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 However, feed-back 
from the NPA on whether it has decided to prosecute or not, is 
by and large not forthcoming. For example, in 2016/17 IPID 
reported that it was awaiting a response from the NPA in 96% 
of cases. In 2017/18 this figure dropped to 72%; the lowest 
level since 2013/14. For reasons that are not clear, the NPA 
seems to be less than eager to prosecute police officials. The 
NPA is an essential part of the accountability architecture, yet 
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Disciplinary action v cases reported to IPID
SAPS displinary action No. of Complaints lodged with IPID
Figure 2 






From the above it is concluded that the accountability chain in 
SAPS is broken and that this is clear when the comparison is 
made with disciplinary code enforcement in DCS. The Ethics 
Institute research findings referred to above indicated that 
police officials are engaged in corruption on a substantial scale 
and based on that it is safe to assume that disciplinary 
infringements would at least be of a similar frequency in these 
two departments and it is therefore simply not a credible 
explanation that police officials are more compliant with 
departmental prescripts and applicable legislation than DCS 
officials. A further lesson to be taken from DCS is that at the 
time of the Jali Commission, there was a realisation that the 
enforcement of discipline is integral to the management 
function and this responsibility rests with all managers.
22
 
Following from this, the disciplinary code was renegotiated 
with organised labour; officials were trained in conducting and 
presiding over disciplinary hearings, and support structures 
established for staff. In short, there was a concerted effort to 
regain control over internal discipline and the results are 
visible, as shown in Figure 1. 
In this brief overview it is apparent that accountability of SAPS 
fails on four fronts. Firstly, very few officials are subject to 
internal discipline, especially given the size of the SAPS staff 
establishment, some 195 000 employees. Calculated as a per 
1000 ratio, on average SAPS disciplined 23 employees per 1000 
annually compared to DCS at 82 per 1000. From 2016/17 to 
2017/18 there was a decline of 56% in the number of officials 
subject to internal discipline, making a bad situation even 
worse. Secondly, when disciplinary action is instituted, in 62% 
of cases on average the charges are either withdrawn or the 
official acquitted. This indicates that matters are not properly 
investigated and/or presented to the disciplinary tribunal. 
Thirdly, the few cases that do proceed to the NPA via IPID, 
appear to get stuck there with a decision from the NPA not 
forthcoming. Fourthly, seen together, the message is not 
communicated to SAPS officials that transgressing officials will 
be held accountable, even when transgressions are relatively 
minor. This is important, because it is not reacting to the small 
transgressions that create the scope for more serious 
transgressions.  
ACJR is a project of the Dullah Omar Institute at the University 
of the Western Cape. We engage in high-quality research, 
teaching and advocacy on criminal justice reform and human 
rights in Africa. Our work supports targeted evidence-based 
advocacy and policy development promoting good governance 
and human rights in criminal justice systems. Our work is 
anchored in international, regional and domestic law. We 
promote policy, law and practice reform based on evidence. 
We have a particular focus on effective oversight over the 
criminal justice system, especially in relation to the deprivation 
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